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Selected Developments in California Law
Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.: Diligent
Plaintiffs Get Preferential Trial Dates

A plaintiff facing the five-year statutory deadline for bringing a
case to trial' may either toll the statute2 or request that a preferential
3
trial date be set within the five-year period. California Code of Civil
Procedure section 36(d) allows a trial court the discretion to grant
4
or deny a plaintiff's motion for preference. California appellate
1. An action which is not brought to trial within five years after it is commenced must
be dismissed, either on the motion of any party, or on the court's own motion. CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE §§ 583.310, 583.360 (West Supp. 1987). For purposes of the five-year statute, an
action is brought to trial when the jury has been sworn; or in a nonjury trial, when the first
witness has been sworn. Hartman v. Santamarina, 30 Cal. 3d 762, 765, 639 P.2d 979, 980,
180 Cal. Rptr. 337, 338 (1982).
2. One way to toll the five-year statute is to show that bringing the case to trial within
five years was "impossible, impracticable or futile." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.340(c) (West
Supp. 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 18-25.
3. Statutes describe the kinds of cases which may be entitled to preference in trial setting.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 35 (West 1982) (election contests), 36(a), (c) (aged or ill parties),
36(d) (for good cause, and in the interests of justice), 37(a) (West Supp. 1987) (civil suits by
felony victims), 460.7(c) (actions for libel or slander committed during the course of a political
campaign), 527(a) (injunctive relief cases), 1062.3 (declaratory relief actions), 1141.20 (requests
for a de novo trial after an arbitration award), 1170.5 (forcible entry and detainer actions),
1179a (actions to recover possession of real property), 1260.010 (West 1982) (eminent domain
proceedings); CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 21168.3 (West 1986) (actions attacking rulings of state
environmental agencies). Various hybrid civil matters are also entitled to priority in trial or
hearing. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4701(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987) (family law matters relating
to support of a minor), 4600.6(a), (b) (West 1983) (family law matters relating to custody of
a minor).
4. Section 36(d) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant
a motion for preference served with the memorandum to set or the at-issue memorandum and accompanied by a showing of cause which satisfies the court that the
interests of justice will be served by granting such a preference.
CAL. CiM. PROC. CODE § 36(d) (West Supp. 1987).

1251

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
courts, however, are divided on the issue of whether a trial court
may deny preference when the five-year statutory deadline for bringing a case to trial is imminent. 5 In Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,6
the California Supreme Court ruled that a trial court does not have
a duty to set a preferential trial date for a party even when the fiveyear statutory deadline for bringing a case to trial is impending. 7 A
court may grant a motion for preference when there is a showing of
cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be
served by granting the preferential trial date.3 According to the Salas
opinion, a trial court should consider the totality of circumstances,
including the approach of the five-year statutory deadline, in ruling
on motions for trial preference. 9
Part I of this note examines the legal background of motions for
trial preference. 10 Part II sets forth the facts and rationale of Salas."
Finally, part III discusses the legal ramifications of the opinion in
Salas. 2
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Placing the Salas decision in context requires a preliminary discussion of the statutes and case law governing dismissals of causes of
action. Involuntary dismissals may be either mandatory 3 or discretionary. 14 Failure to bring an action to trial within five years after
the commencement of the suit mandates dismissal. 15 Dismissal may
5.

6.
7.
8.
§ 36(d)
9.
10.

See infra text accompanying notes 25-66.

42 Cal. 3d 342, 721 P.2d 590, 228 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1986).
Id. at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
Id. at 345-46, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (citing CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE
(West Supp. 1987)).
Id. at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 al. Rptr. at 508.
See infra text accompanying notes 13-66.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 67-102.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 103-20.
13. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.360(a), (b) (West Supp. 1987) (dismissal is mandatory
if time limits are not met). For time limits see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 583.210
Supp. 1987) (failure to serve defendant within three years), 583.310 (failure to bring to(Vest
trial
within five years), 583.320(a)(I)-(3) (failure to bring to retrial within three years after mistrial,
order granting new trial, or reversal on appeal).
14. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 583.420 (West Supp. 1987) (dismissal is discretionary if
time limits are not met). For time limits see, e.g., CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE §§ 583.420(a)(1)
(failure to serve defendant within two years), 583.420(a)(2)(A) (failure to bring to trial
three years), 583.420(a)(3) (failure to bring to retrial within two years after mistrial, within
order
granting new trial, or reversal on appeal).
15. Id. § 583.310 (West Supp. 1987). See supra note I for the language of this section.
See also CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 583.360 (West Supp. 1987) (dismissal is mandated if an
action is not brought to trial within five years). An action is commenced when the original
complaint is filed. Stults v. Thompson, 274 Cal. App. 2d 733, 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523
(1969); Kowalski v. Cohen, 252 Cal. App. 2d 977, 980, 60 Cal. Rptr. 874, 876 (1967).
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be sought by any party, or granted on the court's own motion.1 6
The five-year rule is intended to protect against the loss or destruction

of evidence, the memory of witnesses becoming dim with the passage
of time, and the annoyance to defendants of actions that remain
7
pending indefinitely.'
The five-year statute is tolled, however, if bringing the action to

trial within five years is impossible, impracticable, or futile. 8 Rea-

sonable diligence by the plaintiff in ensuring the case comes to trial
is one factor by which impossibility or impracticability is measured. 19

California appellate courts are, however, divided regarding the length
of time for which the plaintiff must have been diligent in order to

trigger the impossibility or impracticability exceptions. 20

16.

CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 583.360(a) (West Supp. 1987).
17. Moran v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 229, 237, 673 P.2d 216, 221, 197 Cal. Rptr.
546, 551 (1983). See also General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 2d 88, 91, 416
P.2d 492, 494, 52 Cal. Rptr. 460, 462 (1966). The California Supreme Court has commented
that the five-year statute is analogous to statutes of limitation, since both types of statute
serve similar purposes. Id. at 91, 416 P.2d at 494, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.340(c) (vest Supp. 1987) (codifies case law which
sanctioned the impossibility or impracticability exceptions to the five-year statute). No exception
for impossibility or impracticability existed under the former dismissal statute. 1982 Cal. Stat.
ch. 1402, sec. 3, at 5355 (amending CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 583). The impracticability
exception, however, was recognized by case law. See Crown Coach Corp. v. Superior Court,
8 Cal. 3d 540, 546-47, 503 P.2d 1347, 1350-51, 105 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342-43 (1972) (citations
to case law which recognized the exception). See also Fannin Corp. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 745, 750, 111 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (1974) (whether it is impossible, impracticable, or
futile to proceed to trial must be determined in light of the circumstances of each case).
Plaintiff has the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that bringing the case
to trial within five years is impossible or impracticable. Hoffman v. State, 171 Cal. App. 3d
1100, 1108, 217 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872 (1985).
19. Hoffman, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 870. In Hoffman, the plaintiff
failed to exercise "reasonable diligence." Among other things, the plaintiff failed to monitor
the status of the case and failed to respond to communications from opposing counsel. Id. at
1106-07, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
20. Several cases have stated that the plaintiff must have been diligent throughout the
five-year period to claim later circumstances made bringing the case to trial within the fiveyear period impossible or impracticable. Cannon v. City of Novato, 167 Cal. App. 3d 216,
223, 213 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1985); Bennett v. Bennett Cement Contractors, Inc., 125 Cal.
App. 3d 673, 676, 178 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (1981); Moran v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 229,
239-40, 673 P.2d 216, 223, 197 Cal. Rptr. 546, 553 (1983). In Cannon, the appellant's only
discovery activities during the first two years of litigation consisted of propounding five
identical sets of interrogatories. Depositions were not taken until almost five years after the
complaint was filed, and for twenty months appellants filed nothing with the court. The
appellate court concluded that since the appellant's own inactivity throughout the five-year
period made bringing the case to trial impossible, the trial court acted properly in dismissing
the case. Cannon, supra at 223, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
On the other hand, at least one case has held the five-year statute tolled by present
circumstances preventing trial notwithstanding plaintiff's earlier inactivity. Lazelle v. Lovelady,
171 Cal. App. 3d 34, 42, 217 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150 (1985). In Lazelle, the appellant's delay in
the early stages of the proceedings was excused by subsequent court congestion which made a
courtroom unavailable for 69 days. Id.,
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Normal delays in litigation caused by pleadings, pretrial motions,

and waiting for a place on the court calendar do not excuse failure
to comply with the five-year limit. 21 If normal delays are encountered,
the plaintiff must move for a preferential trial setting to avoid the
bar of the five-year statute. A failure to move for preference is
deemed to be a lack of reasonable diligence, thus foreclosing the
plaintiff from using the impossibility exception to the five-year mandatory dismissal statute.2? Once the plaintiff moves for preference,
the court has discretion to grant or deny the motion. 24 Several
California courts have held, however, that a trial court has little or

no discretion to deny preference when the expiration of the five-year
period is imminent. 2
In Weeks v. Roberts,26 the California Supreme Court held that if
the five-year statute was about to run, the trial judge had little
discretion to deny a motion for preferential setting. 27 Thus, the trial
judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant a preferential trial
21. Gentry v. Nielson, 123 Cal. App. 3d 27, 36, 176 Cal. Rptr. 385, 390 (1981); Crown
Coach, 8 Cal. 3d at 548, 503 P.2d at 1351, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 343. But see Goers v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 72, 129 Cal. Rptr 29 (1976). "When plaintiff has waited the normal
time for a place on the calendar and has been assigned such a place well within the five-year
period, his inability thereafter to proceed to trial because of continued court congestion should
not be chargeable to the five-year period." Id. at 74-75, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 30. Abnormal
delays may excuse a failure to comply with the five-year limit, provided that the plaintiff did
not cause the delay. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 95, 191
Cal. Rptr. 549 (1982). In upholding the trial court's refusal to dismiss, the Westinghouse court
cited the impracticability resulting from extensive discovery, the number of the defendant's
cross-complaints, and the lack of prejudice from the delay as reasons to toll the statute for
impracticability. Id. at 106-07, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57.
22. Crown Coach, 8 Cal. 3d at 549, 503 P.2d at 1352-53, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 344.45. In
Crown Coach, despite the plaintiff's allegation that court congestion prevented him from
bringing the case to trial within five years, the court held that the plaintiff should have moved
for a preferential trial date as soon as the plaintiff realized that he was facing a discretionary
dismissal for failure to prosecute within three years. Id.
23. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d at 107-03, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57.
Under most circumstances, the trial court would abuse its discretion in denying a motion to
dismiss when the plaintiff failed to bring a motion for preference. Id. Special circumstances,
however, may excuse the plaintiff's failure to request preference. In Westinghouse, the
plaintiff's failure to move for preference was held not to show a lack of diligence since the
defendant had yet to complete discovery and could not be ready for trial within the five-year
period. Accordingly, even if the motion for preference had been granted, no trial would result
since the defendant was not ready and would, therefore, have to stipulate that the time limit
of the statute be extended. Id. at 108, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
24. Civil Procedure Code § 36(d) provides that "the court may in its discretion grant a
motion for preference served with the memorandum to set or the at-issue memorandum and
accompanied by a showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will
be served by granting such preference." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 36(d) (West 1982).
25. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text (discussion of cases which mandate
granting of preference).
26. 68 Cal. 2d 802, 442 P.2d 361, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968).
27. Id. at 806, 442 P.2d at 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
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date when only twenty-eight days remained in the five-year period. 28
Pretrial proceedings were complete and the trial date set in Weeks,
but the trial date was vacated when plaintiff failed to allow sufficient
time for ordinary trial setting. 29 This caused inconvenience to the
court in providing a courtroom, and thus triggered the possibility of
a discretionary dismissal. 0 Other courts have gone further than Weeks
by holding that the trial judge has no discretion to deny preference
when the end of the five-year period approaches, even in instances
when the plaintiff failed to diligently prosecute the case."
In Campanella v. Takaoka,32 the court relied on Weeks to hold
that a trial judge must set the case for trial before the expiration of
the five-year period even though the plaintiff was guilty of unreasonable delay. 33 The plaintiff in Campanella failed to file an at-issue
memorandum and had completed only minimal discovery in the four
years since the complaint had been filed.3 4 Thirty days before the
five-year statute was to run, the plaintiff sought an early trial date. 35
Ten days before the five-year statute was to run, the trial court heard
and denied the motion for preference.3 6 The court held that insufficient time remained in the five-year period for the plaintiff to give
the defendant the fifteen days trial notice required by statute. 37 The
statutory five-year period expired, and the trial judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss under California Code of Civil Procedure section 583(b).3 1 On appeal, the court held that since the trial
judge heard the motion for preference only ten days before the fiveyear statute was to expire, the trial court made it impossible for the

28. Id. at 808, 442 P.2d at 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 307. "[A] trial court should not confuse
and discredit the law by refusing to set a cause within the five-year period because it believes
that a discretionary dismissal [for failure to prosecute within two years] is warranted." Id. at
806, 442 P.2d at 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
29. Id. at 804, 442 P.2d at 362, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
30. Id. at 806, 442 P.2d at 363-64, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
31. See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
32. 160 Cal. App. 3d 504, 206 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1984).
33. Id. at 513, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
34. Id. at 508-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
35. Id.
36. Id. Civil Procedure Code § 1005 allows a party to make a motion to specially set a
case for trial after 15 days notice of the motion to all parties. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1005
(West Supp. 1987). Although the plaintiff in Campanellarequested an ex parte order shortening
the notice required to be given to all parties, the request was denied and the motion for
preference heard with only 10 days left in the 5-year period. Campanella, 160 Cal. App. 3d at
511, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
37. Campanella, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
38. Id. at 509, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
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plaintiff to give the defendant the requisite fifteen day trial notice.39
Since the plaintiff moved for preference within sufficient time to
fulfill statutory trial notice requirements, the trial court was in error
in denying the motion for preference, despite the plaintiff's lack of
diligence. 40
In Kotoff v. Efseaff,41 the court of appeal held that a full court
calendar and the plaintiff's lack of diligence in bringing the case to
trial were not valid reasons to deny a motion for preference. 42 The
plaintiff had twice failed to file a certificate of readiness for trial,
and 43the superior court clerk dropped the case from the civil active
list. Ninety-seven days before the expiration of the five-year statutory period, the court sent the plaintiff a notice of intention to
dismiss. 44 The plaintiff moved for a preferential trial date. 45 The trial
-judge denied the motion, citing the plaintiffs lack of diligence in
46
prosecuting the action as a reason to not disturb the trial calendar.
The appellate court reversed, finding error in the denial of preference
where ninety-seven days remained in the statutory period, and found
it "monstrous to foreclose the plaintiff's day in court because the
calendar was already set." ' 47 Since the trial court's erroneous denial
of the motion made the plaintiff's efforts to bring the case to trial
could not
within the statutory five-year period impossible, the case
4
be dismissed for failure to prosecute within five years. 1
On the other hand, one California appellate court affirmed the
denial of a motion for early trial setting because the plaintiff was
not diligent in prosecuting the case. 49 In Karubian v. Security Pacific

39.

Id. at 511, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 749. By denying the plaintiff's request for an ex parte

order, the trial court rendered impossible the plaintiff's compliance with the 15-day trial notice
requirement imposed by Civil Procedure Code § 594(a). When the motion for preference was
heard, less than 15 days remained till the end of the 5-year period. Campanella, 160 Cal. App.
3d at 511, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
40. Campanella, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
41. 172 Cal. App. 3d 991, 218 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985).
42. Id. at 998, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 503. So long as a reasonable time before the expiration
of the five-year period exists in which to bring the case to trial, preference should be granted.

Id.
43. Id. at 994, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 995, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
47. Id. at 997, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
48. Id. Although 97 days remained in the statutory 5-year period, in Los Angeles it
generally took 6 months from the time a certificate of readiness for trial was filed for a case
to get to trial. Id.
49. Karubian v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 152 Cal. App. 3d 134, 139-40, 199 Cal. Rptr.
295, 299 (1984).
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National Bank 5 0° the plaintiff failed to file an at-issue memorandum
and waited until forty days before the five-year period was to expire
before moving to specially set the case for trial.51 The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's decisions to deny preference and to dismiss
the case under the five-year statute.52 In deciding whether to grant
preference, the court of appeal held that a trial court is to consider
the entire factual picture, not just the impending end of the fiveyear period.5 3 In Karubian, the court found that granting preference
would have substantially prejudiced the defendants by delaying both
the accumulation of evidence and documents and the procurement
of depositions.5 4 The lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff,
together with the potential for prejudice to the defendant, formed
the factual picture which justified a denial of the motion for pref55
erence.
The essential conflict among California courts of appeal before
the Salas decision, therefore, was whether a trial court had discretion
to deny a motion for preference in the face of the imminent end of
the stautory five-year period for bringing a case to trial. The courts
which reversed a denial of preference held that a plaintiff's lack of
6
diligence could not be considered in hearing a motion for preference.
These courts argued that lack of diligence could only be considered
in deciding whether to grant or deny discretionary dismissal for
failure to prosecute within three years.5 7 In addition, the view requiring granting of priority finds support in the policy favoring a
trial on the merits.58

50. Id.
51. Id. at 136-37, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
52. Id. at 140-41, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
53. Id. at 140, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
54. Id. at 140, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
55. Id.
56. Weeks v. Roberts, 68 Cal. 2d 802, 442 P.2d 361, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968); Campanella
v. Takaoka, 160 Cal. App. 3d 504, 206 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1984); Kotoff v. Efseaff, 172 Cal.
App. 3d 991, 218 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985).
57. Campanella, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 750; Kotoff, 172 Cal. App.
3d at 996-97, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (only in considering a motion for discretionary dismissal
under Civil Procedure Code § 583.410, must the trial court balance various factors including
the diligence of the plaintiff and the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant from the delay).
See CAL. R. Cr. 373; infra note 118 (factors weighed in deciding on motions for discretionary
dismissal).
58. This policy is expressed in statutes pertaining to dismissal. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE §
583.130 (West Supp. 1987) (legislative declaration of policy). In addition, the California Law
Revision Commission has stated that "the policy underlying the dismissal statute, the prevention
of unreasonable delays in litigation, is less powerful than the policy which seeks to dispose of
litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds." Cal. L. Revision Comm'n,

1257

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
Other courts of appeal granted discretion to trial judges to deny
preferential trial settings.5 9 These courts favored a balancing approach, which weighed the plaintiff's lack of diligence against the
entire factual picture, including prejudice to the defendant, in order
to determine whether to grant the motion for preference. 60 Arguments
supporting the view granting discretion to trial judges to deny preference
are expressed in several ways. First, this view is supported by the policy
requiring all parties to a civil suit to cooperate in bringing a case to
trial.61 Secondly, proponents of discretion argue that procrastination
by dilatory litigants should not be rewarded. 62 In addition, unfairness
to diligent litigants already on the trial calendar in displacing them
for careless plaintiffs is prevented. 63 Proponents also argue that a
trial court should weigh the same factors in assessing motions for
preference as it does in ruling on discretionary dismissals. 64 A final
argument is that alternative forums for a hearing on the merits are

available to the plaintiff.65 The conflict among California courts of
appeal, therefore, set the stage for a decision by the California

Recommendation Relating to Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution, 16 CAL. L. Rev. Coinf'N
REp. 2211 (1982). Substantial California case law also supports the policy favoring trial on
the merits. See, e.g., Weeks, 68 Cal. 2d at 806, 442 P.2d at 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 308; Herring
v. Peterson, 116 Cal. App. 3d 608, 615-16, 172 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (1981). Finally, by way
of analogy, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imply a preference for trial on the merits.
FED. R. Civ. P. 40.
59. Karubian v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 152 Cal. App. 3d 134, 199 Cal. Rptr. 295
(1985); Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 349, 218 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1985),
aff'd, 42 Cal. 3d 342, 721 P.2d 590, 228 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1986).
60. Karubian, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 140, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
61. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 583.130 (West Supp. 1987).
62. Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 42 Cal. 3d 342, 349, 721 P.2d 590, 594, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 508 (1986).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 346, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506; Wilson v. Sunshine Meat Co., 34
Cal. 3d 554, 561, 669 P.2d 9, 13, 194 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (1983). Since both forms of
involuntary dismissal are addressed to a "court's sound legal discretion, the motivating factors
in the exercise of that discretion would be pertinent to both motions." Id.
65. If a case is submitted to judicial arbitration during the last six months of the fiveyear period, or is submitted earlier and remains in arbitration during any part of the last six
months, the five-year period is tolled. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1141.17 (West Supp. 1987).
The tolling provision applies whether the case was ordered to arbitration, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1141.11 (West Supp. 1987), the parties have stipulated to arbitration, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1141.12(b)(i) (West Supp. 1987), or the plaintiff has elected arbitration, CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1141.12(b)(ii). R. WEi. & I. BROWN, JR., CIVM PROCEDURE BEFORE TmiAL §
11:210.1 (Cal. Prac. Guide 1986). E.g., Lazelle v. Lovelady, 171 Cal. App. 3d 34, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 145 (1985) (plaintiff elected arbitration five days before the end of the five-year period).
See also Niesner v. Kusch, 186 Cal. App. 3d 291, 230 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1986) (a plaintiff who
anticipates denial of a motion for preference may elect judicial arbitration both to toll the
five-year statute, and to gain access to a forum for a hearing of the case on the merits).
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Supreme Court. In Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., that court resolved
66
the conflict.

II.

THM CASE

A. The Facts
The plaintiff in Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.6 7 was injured when
he was accidentally shot by a friend who was testing a rifle purchased
from the defendant.6 On September 12, 1979, the plaintiff brought
actions against Sears 69 and against the friend.70 On June 3, 1980, the
plaintiff filed an at-issue memorandum in order to have the case
placed on the civil active list maintained by the trial court. 7' The
case was removed from the civil active list following the plaintiff's
failure to give written notice of the trial setting conference to the
defendants. 72 Plaintiff did nothing during the succeeding ten months
73
to reinstate the case on the civil active list or set the case for trial.
On August 3, 1984, forty days before the expiration of the five-year
limit, the plaintiff filed a motion for trial preference. 74 Sears filed a
motion in opposition, asking the court to dismiss. 75 The trial court
entered a tentative ruling denying plaintiff's motion for preference,
on the ground of lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff.76 The
trial court, however, ordered a second hearing on the motion to be
held three days later, inviting the parties to file supplemental papers
in support of their respective positions. 77 The plaintiff failed to submit
any supplemental declarations or authorities and the court denied
the plaintiff's motion for preference. 78 On September 26, 1984, after

66. See infra text accompanying notes 82-102.
67. 42 Cal. 3d 342, 721 P.2d 590, 228 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1986).
68. Id. at 344, 721 P.2d at 590, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
69. The plaintiff sought damages against Sears on negligence, warranty, and strict liability
theories. Id. at 344, 721 P.2d at 590-91, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05.
70. The plaintiff sought damages against the friend for negligence. Id.
71. Id. at 344, 721 P.2d at 591, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. See supra note 4 (text of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 36(d)).
75. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 345, 721 P.2d at 591, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 505. Former § 583(a)
was the discretionary dismissal statute for failure to prosecute within two years. See 1982 Cal.
Stat. ch. 1402, sec. 3, at 5355 (amending CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 583). The current statute
extends the time period to three years. CAL. CirV. PROC. CODE § 583.420(a)(2)(A) (vest Supp.

1987).
76.
77.
78.

Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 345, 721 P.2d at 591, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
Id.
Id.
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the expiration of the five-year statutory period, the trial court granted

defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. 79 The plaintiff
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 0 Thereafter the California

Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal. 8'
B.

The Opinion

The California Supreme Court in Salas held that the trial court
has discretion to grant or deny a motion for trial preference.82 The
approach of the five-year limit is a crucial, but not the exclusive,
consideration in ruling on such a motion.83 A motion for preference
requires the same issues to be balanced as does a motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute within three years.8 4 The issues to be weighed
include the dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the

court's calendar, the rights of other litigants, the prejudice to the
defendant by an accelerated trial date, and the likelihood of eventual
mandatory dismissal for failure to prosecute within five years if the
preferential trial date is denied. 85 In adopting the balancing test for
deciding motions for trial preference, the California Supreme Court
explicitly disapproved earlier appellate court rulings which prohibited
a trial court, once the five-year bar was imminent, from considering
either the plaintiff's lack of diligence or prejudice to the defendant.8 6
The plaintiff in Salas, relying on Weeks v. Roberts,87 argued that
the trial court had a duty to grant an early trial setting to prevent a
mandatory dismissal for failure to prosecute within five years.88 In
Weeks, the California Supreme Court declared that twenty-eight days

was, as a matter of law, a reasonable time within which to provide

79. Id.
80. Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 349, 218 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1985),
aff'd, 42 Cal. 3d 342, 721 P.2d 590, 228 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1986).
81. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 350, 721 P.2d at 595, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
82. Id. at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
83. Id. at 346, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
84. Id. at 346, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (citing Wilson v. Sunshine Meat
& Liquor Co., 34 Cal. 3d 559, 561, 669 P.2d 9, 13, 194 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (1983)); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.420(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
85. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 347, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506; see also CAL. R.
CT. 373(e) (enumerating additional factors a trial judge is to consider in ruling on motions
for trial preference).
86. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 346, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The court disapproved
Campanella v. Takaoka, 160 Cal. App. 3d 504, 206 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1984), and Kotoff v.
Efseaff, 172 Cal. App. 3d 991, 218 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985).
87. 68 Cal. 2d 802, 442 P.2d 361, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968).
88. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 345, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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a courtroom in order to avoid mandatory dismissal. 9 The Salas court
distinguished Weeks on the facts. 90In Salas, the plaintiff failed either
to initiate discovery or to restore the case to the civil active list
before moving for a trial preference. 91 In Weeks, however, the
plaintiff had completed both discovery and pretrial proceedings, and
had been granted a preferential trial date within the five-year period
when another judge vacated the setting due to a shortage of courtrooms. 92 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument. 93
The plaintiff, citing dicta in Weeks, further argued that a preferred
procedure would be to grant preferential dates expressly without
prejudice to the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.9 4 This procedure, however, was grounded in the limits of former
California Code of Civil Procedure section 583(a), 95 which prohibited
the trial judge from dismissing on his own motion and, instead,
required a defendant to move for dismissal. 96 The Weeks dicta,
therefore, inhibited a trial judge from denying a preferential setting
solely to achieve dismissal on a defendant's motion. 97 Since California
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410(a) now permits a trial judge
to dismiss on his or her own motion, the need for a trial judge to
grant preference and concurrently preserve a defendant's right to
move for dismissal is obviated. 98 According to the California Supreme
Court, the plaintiff in Salas, therefore, could not rely on the dicta
in Weeks to support a motion for preference. 99
California appellate courts had relied on the Weeks reasoning in
holding that trial judges had a duty to grant a trial preference to
plaintiffs faced with the expiration of the five-year statute. 1' ° In
disapproving Weeks' two rationales for mandating preference, the
court in Salas moved towards a more literal interpretation of the
statute authorizing preference.' 01 Since the statute clearly commends

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Weeks, 68 Cal. 2d at 807, 442 P.2d at 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 347-48, 721 P.2d at 593, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
Id.
Weeks, 68 Cal. 2d at 804, 442 P.2d at 362, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 348, 721 P.2d at 593, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
Id.
1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1402, sec. 3, at 5355 (amending CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 583).
Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 348, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
Id.
Id.

99. Id.
100.
101.

See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 (statutory language of CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 36(d)).
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the decision whether to grant or deny preference to a trial judge's
sound discretion, the holding in Salas complements the statutory
language.102
III.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

In view of the policies militating against a mandatory grant of
preference, 13 a plaintiff's conduct in bringing a case to trial must be
a factor in the totality of circumstances test applied by a trial court
in determining whether to grant a motion for trial preference.l°4 Read
most narrowly, the message of Salas is clearly to encourage diligence
in the prosecution of suits.105 Read more broadly, Salas may, particularly in view of congested civil dockets,""6 signal an erosion of the
policy favoring trial on the merits./°7
One question left unanswered in Salas is whether it is ever too late
in the five-year statutory period to request preference. Dicta in Salas
suggests an advantage to early application for preference, since "there
will remain ample time for a plaintiff to prepare his case for trial
and submit a subsequent motion for trial preference on the basis
that the case would otherwise face dismissal."'

°

Since timely appli-

cation for preference is one sign of reasonable diligence by a plaintiff,C if the plaintiff foresees delay early in the proceedings and
makes an early motion for preference, discretionary dismissal will
not be granted; hence, the plaintiff has the option to move for
preference a second time prior to the end of the five-year period." 0
However, a plaintiff who does not foresee delays does not apply for
early preference. In such a case, where the delay is normal, albeit

102.

Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 348, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508; see also note 4
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 36(d)).
103. See supra notes 61-65.
104. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
105. Id. The procedure for restoring a case to the civil active list depends on the rules set
by local superior courts. Some superior courts require a motion to be made, while others
reinstate the case automatically or at preset intervals. R. WELL & I. BROWN, JR., CWnM
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 12:28 (Cal. Pract. Guide 1986).
106. In Sacramento county, once the at-issue memorandum is filed for an action commencing in Superior Court, a plaintiff can expect a trial date 14 months in the future.
Conversation with Mr. Bob Borghese, Master Calendar Supervisor, Sacramento County Courthouse (Apr. 6, 1987) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
107. See Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508. The Salos court,
despite reaffirming the policy against disposing of litigation on procedural grounds, held that
the policy would prevail only if plaintiff made some showing of excusable delay. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying note 23.
110. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.

(statutory language of
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unforeseen, the five-year statute will not be tolled 1 ' and the plaintiff
must rely on a favorable outcome of the balancing test at a late2
preference hearing to have any chance of a hearing on the merits."
Whether a request for preference is a plaintiff's first or second
request, language in Salas suggests that a motion for preference may
be decided on the "eve" of the expiration of the statutory five-year
period."' The courts of appeal, however, both before and after Salas,
have suggested that at least twenty-one days must remain in the fiveyear period." 4 In view of the requirement that all parties have fifteen
days' notice of a trial date," 5 it is likely that a motion for preference
no later than fifteen days before the statutory period
may be heard
6

is to end."

111. See supra text accompanying note 21.
112. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
113. "A discretionary standard for determining motions under section 36(d), even on the
eve of the five-year deadline, is consistent with the legislative intent to promote diligent and
orderly prosecution .... " Id.
114. See Dick v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 230 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (21
days left in the 5-year period). In Dick, the appellate court stated that since neither case law
nor statute set a mandatory minimum time within which motions for preference had to be
brought, the amount of time left in the five-year period was not determinative of the motion.
Id. at 1167, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 302. See also Weeks v. Roberts, 68 Cal. 2d 802, 807, 442 P.2d
361, 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (1968) (28 days); Vogelsang v. Owl Trucking Co., 40 Cal.
App. 3d 1068, 1071, 115 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (1974) (46 days).
115. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 594(a) (West Supp. 1987).
116. Although statutes specify the notice a defendant is entitled to, for a hearing on
plaintiff's motion to set a preferential trial date, an ex parte order shortening the time for
service and hearing of the motion may be granted. Griffis v. S.S. Kresge Co., 150 Cal. App.
3d 491, 498, 197 Cal. Rptr. 771, 775 (1984) (a plaintiff may "reasonably expect" to receive
an ex parte order shortening time in which to bring a motion to specially set a case for trial).
A trial court must, nonetheless, comply with California Civil Procedure Code § 594(a) which
provides that an issue of fact may not be tried in the absence of an adverse party unless it is
shown to the satisfaction of the court that the adverse party had 15 days notice of the date
set for trial. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 594(a) (West Supp. 1987). Compliance with California
Civil Procedure Code § 594(a) is mandatory. Irvine Nat'l Bank v. Han, 130 Cal. App. 3d
693, 697, 181 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1982). The 15-day time limit may not be shortened except
by waiver or consent of the parties. Minkin v. Levander, 186 Cal. App. 3d 64, 70, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 595 (1986) (citing Bird v. McGuire, 216 Cal. App. 2d 702, 713, 31 Cal. Rptr. 386,
396 (1963)). Accordingly, even though the motion to specially set may be heard with less than
15-days' notice, a trial date cannot be set by a trial court less than 15 days from the date the
motion was heard. Id. The interplay of the 5-year dismissal statute and the 15-day notice
provision of Civil Procedure Code § 594(a) becomes clear. If a plaintiff's request for preference
is heard with less than 15 days remaining in the 5-year period, the 15-day trial notice provision
must, nevertheless, be met and the 5-year deadline will expire during the notice period. A
plaintiff who wishes to press his claim is left with just two alternatives: to assert the impossibility
exception in order to toli the 5-year dismissal statute, or to secure the defendant's consent to
waiving the 15-day trial notice requirement. In Minkin, the plaintiff's motion for preference
was heard 10 days before the expiration of the 5-year statute. The trial judge rejected the
plaintiff's claim that despite the mandatory provisions of Civil Procedure Code § 594(a) a
trial date be set within 10 days. The appellate court, citing Salas, affirmed. Given the plaintiff's
"procrastination" in pursuing his claim, neither the impossibility exception nor the Salas
balancing test could save his claim. Minkin, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
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A second question left unanswered in Salas is whether additional
factors will be considered in deciding a plaintiff's motion to specially
set a case for trial. The five factors on which Salas focused 1 7 were
derived from rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court." 8 The
rule, however, enumerates six factors plus "any other circumstance"
relevant to a fair determination of the issue." 9 Given the rationale
for using the same general test for motions for preference as is used
for motions for discretionary dismissals, 20 it seems likely that future
decisions will use all the factors, as circumstances may warrant.
CONCLUSION

In Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the California Supreme Court
held that a trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances
when deciding whether to grant a motion for preference.' 2' The
impending expiration of the five-year period within which a plaintiff
is required to bring a case to trial is not conclusive, but is only one
of the factors to be balanced in the determination.' 2 Prior to Salas,
the lower courts were divided on the issue of whether a trial court
had a duty to grant a motion for preference when the five-year
statutory deadline for bringing a case to trial was imminent. 23 The
California Supreme Court held, in Salas, that despite the approaching
expiration of the five-year statute, a trial court retained discretion

117. See supra text accompanying note 85.
118.

California Rules of Court 373(e) provides the following:

In ruling on the motion the court shall consider all matters relevant to a proper
determination of the motion, including the court's file in the case and the affidavits
and declarations and supporting data submitted by the parties and, where applicable,
the availability of the moving party and other essential parties for service of process;
the diligence in seeking to effect service of process; the extent to which the parties

engaged in any settlement negotiations or discussions; the diligence of the parties in
pursuing discovery or other pretrial proceedings, including any extraordinary relief
sought by either party; the nature and complexity of the case; the law applicable to

the case, including the pendency of other litigation under a common set of facts or
determinative of the legal or factual issues in the case, the nature of any extensions
of time or other delay attributable to either party, the condition of the court's

calendar and the availability of an earlier trial date if the matter was ready for trial;
whether the interests of justice are best served by dismissal or trial of the case; and

any other fact or circumstance relevant to a fair determination of the issue. The
court shall be guided by the policies set forth in section 583.130 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

CAL. R. CT. 373(e) (West Supp. 1987).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 85.
See supra text accompanying note 83.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-65.
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and was to consider the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the case to
trial as one among many factors in deciding the motion for preference.12 4
Two questions were left undecided in Salas,-5 however both appear
amenable to resolution. First, despite the suggestion in Salas that
motions for preference could be heard on the eve of the expiration
of the five-year period, 126 the language of California Code of Civil
Procedure section 594(a) mandates fifteen days notice to adverse
parties of the date set for trial.127 Accordingly, a motion to specially
set a case for trial within the statutory limit must be granted, if at
all, at least fifteen days before the five-year period expires. Second,
although the court in Salas balanced five factors in deciding on a
motion for preference,'2 it appears likely that the additional factors
enumerated in Rule 373(e) 129 could be used, as circumstances warrant.
Maria G. Narayan

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 108-20.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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